Last updated: September 9, 2026
We would rather publish a record of being wrong than a claim of never being wrong. Every substantive factual error found on this site is logged below with the date, what the site said, and what it says now. Nothing is quietly edited out.
Typo fixes, formatting, and rewording that does not change meaning are not logged. Anything that changes a date, a number, a citation, a name, or a factual assertion is.
2026
We published a child’s text messages on a page where we promise we do not, and called a sworn statement fabricated in our own voice.
- What we said
- The evidence timeline’s 10 January 2026 entry reproduced correspondence at length. It included a block headed “EVIDENCE ATTACHED — ‘Hungry’ Messages” quoting four dated messages from a child asking for food; a block headed “VISITATION EXTORTION”; a recipient list reading “BCC: 200+ global media outlets”; a thread timeline including “I will withdraw TREC and BAR COMPLAINT TODAY IF YOU ACT IN GOOD FAITH”; and, appended to a quoted statement by the other parent, the parenthetical “(the fabricated accusation)”.
- What is correct
- Two separate failures. First: this site states that “children’s identifying information has been omitted to protect their privacy.” Publishing dated messages from a child asking for food broke that promise on the page where it mattered most. Those messages are the private words of a child who did not choose to be published and who cannot consent now. Second: “the fabricated accusation” is this site asserting, in its own voice and as fact, that another person’s sworn statement was false. No court, agency or bar authority has made any such finding. Our own methodology requires claims of that rank to be written as “the pleadings allege” and says plainly they are never to be stated as fact.
- What changed
- The 10 January entry is cut back to the fact that a one-dollar settlement demand was sent in Cause No. 202595850 and not accepted, plus the outcome of that suit. The child’s messages, the recipient list, the thread timeline, the “extortion” heading and the “fabricated” characterisation are all removed. The 13 January entry, which announced that “full disclosure begins at 5:01 PM”, is reduced to the fact that the deadline passed.
- Why it mattered
- A site that asks to be trusted about other people’s conduct cannot break its own stated rule about children in the same document. And a page that presents itself as an evidence timeline is the last place a conclusion should be smuggled in as a label.
- What we did not change
- The underlying correspondence exists and is in the possession of the parties. It is not being denied — it is simply not republished here.
- How we found it
- An outside review commissioned on 9 September 2026, reading the site the way an unfriendly reader would. Two independent reviewers, briefed separately and for different purposes, both identified this block first.
Our “None” table stated an unbounded negative, and it did not mention a protective order that exists
- What we said
- On the documentary-comparison page, a four-row table reported “None” for police report, protective order, text messages and contemporaneous documentation. Three rows carried a time scope in the row label; the protective-order row carried none, so it read as an absolute claim that no protective order was ever filed.
- What is correct
- A protective order was issued on 8 April 2024 in a separate criminal cause. It postdates the affidavit, which was sworn on 19 March 2024, and arises from a different alleged incident, so it falls outside what that row was intended to say. But the row as written did not say that, and a reader who found the order elsewhere would reasonably conclude the table had been written to conceal it.
- What changed
- Every row is now scoped to the period of the alleged threat and reports “none located” rather than “None” — a dated statement about what was found in the filings reviewed, not a claim about what exists in the world. The 8 April 2024 order is disclosed on the page itself. A qualifier stating that the page alleges no crime now sits directly above the summary list as well as in the introduction, because the summary is the part that gets screenshotted.
- Also fixed
- On the case study, “I will prove that the certification… was false” and the reference to Penal Code § 37.10 both now carry, in the same block, the statement that these are allegations, denied and unadjudicated. On the outreach page, a list naming individual broadcasters contacted in January 2026 has been removed and the “live campaign” framing retired.
- Why it mattered
- An absolute negative is disproved by a single counterexample. Once one cell in a four-row table needs an asterisk, every other claim on the page is discounted with it — including the ones that are solid. Scoping the claim costs nothing and makes it checkable.
We published a $48M liability figure, a $37.9M savings figure and a 350% return on investment. None of them had a calculation behind it.
- What we said
- The case study displayed, as headline statistics, “$48M estimated liability from fraudulent judgments”, “~$10.8M estimated annual prevention cost”, “$37.9M potential net savings” and “~350% estimated return on investment”, marked with an asterisk reading “based on publicly available data and internal estimates” and “projections based on internal analysis.” The legislative brief separately stated that a $50 constable service fee would fund both constable operations and the proposed registry, under the heading Fiscal Note — Self-Funding.
- What is correct
- We cannot produce a derivation for any of them. The $48M figure appeared nowhere else on this site and rested on nothing we can now identify. The $37.9M savings figure was calculated from a $50 per-service cost that this site’s own methodology section had already recorded, on 23 August 2026, as unsupportable — the sourced county rates are $70 and up. And the three numbers did not agree with each other: $48M minus $10.8M is $37.2M, not the $37.9M published beside them. The 350% return was derived from the same broken chain.
- What changed
- All four figures are removed rather than corrected, because there is no underlying calculation to correct. The case study now shows only the two figures that trace to a named public source — 200,000+ family law filings in Texas district courts in FY 2023 (Office of Court Administration) and $70–$100 per citation served (Texas Comptroller fees dashboard). The projection section is replaced with a plain statement of what a fiscal note could and could not establish. The legislative brief no longer names a fee level and no longer claims the proposal is self-funding.
- Why it mattered
- These figures existed to be carried into a legislative office. A fiscal claim put in front of a budget analyst is checked, and a number that collapses under one subtraction discredits everything filed with it — including the parts that are correct. The argument for this proposal rests on a documented procedural defect, not on a savings estimate, and it is stronger without numbers it cannot defend.
- What we did not change
- The per-case back-end cost ranges remain, still labelled as ranges drawn from typical Texas family law attorney fees rather than from a survey. They illustrate scale and are marked as doing so.
- How we found it
- While assembling a legislator outreach package from existing site content. The 23 August 2026 note about the $50 figure had already identified the broken input; nobody had gone back to the outputs computed from it. That is the recurring shape of error on this site — a correction applied to a source without recomputing what depended on it.
- A known gap
- Texas courts do not publish how many SAPCR judgments are taken by default, or how many rest on a Rule 239a certificate. Without that denominator no statewide cost figure is honest. Obtaining it from the Office of Court Administration is the single most useful piece of research this proposal needs.
Our evidence timeline said the suit was dismissed. It did not say we brought it, lost it, were assessed fees, or that it is now final.
- What we said
- The notice at the top of the evidence timeline stated that Willis v. Rendon Legal, PLLC and Laci Rendon (Cause No. 202595850) “was dismissed with prejudice on 19 March 2026” and that no findings of misconduct had been entered.
- What is correct
- That was true but materially incomplete. The suit was brought by the author of this site, and he lost it. The dismissal was granted on the defendants’ Rule 91a motion, which requires the court to find the claims had no basis in law or fact, and the court assessed $1,500 in attorney’s fees against the plaintiff. Every deadline to move for new trial or appeal expired on 2 July 2026. The judgment is final and cannot now be challenged.
- What changed
- The notice now states all of it: who brought the suit, the Rule 91a basis and what that finding means, the fee award, and the date the judgment became unappealable.
- Why it mattered
- “Dismissed with prejudice” on its own can read as a procedural off-ramp. A reader auditing this site — a journalist, a legislative staffer, an opposing lawyer — would find the rest in the docket within minutes, and finding it there rather than here would be reason to distrust everything else on the page. A timeline that presents allegations is only worth reading if it is candid about how the case carrying them ended.
- What we did not change
- The timeline entries themselves. They describe allegations made in public filings, they were never proven, and they are still labelled that way.
We told readers to plan around four years. Where parental rights were terminated or a child was adopted, the deadline is six months.
- What we said
- Across the void-judgment and bill-of-review pages: “plan around four years,” “a bill of review inside four years,” “treat anything longer as a bonus.” The only qualification we stated was the one from PNS Stores — whether the jurisdictional defect appears on the face of the record. We named no statute that shortens the window.
- What is correct
- Two Family Code sections impose an absolute six-month bar running from the date the order was signed. § 161.211: an order terminating parental rights is not subject to collateral or direct attack after the sixth month, whether the parent was personally served (a) or served by citation by publication (b); where the termination rested on an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment or waiver of interest, the attack is limited to fraud, duress or coercion in executing the affidavit (c). § 162.012(a): the validity of an adoption order is not subject to attack after six months. Both apply notwithstanding Rule 329, so the two-year publication route does not reopen them.
- Why it mattered
- A parent whose rights were terminated by default, reading our pages, was handed a deadline more than seven times longer than the real one — and unlike the four-year bill-of-review period, this one bars a direct attack too, so there is no fallback once it passes. Telling someone they have four years when they have six months is the most damaging single error this site could publish, because the reader who relies on it does nothing until the window has closed.
- What changed
- Six pages now carry the carve-out: the deadline calculator and overturn a custody order state both sections in full, including the subsection detail; bill of review, default judgment, improper service and the glossary carry a one-sentence qualifier. We also say plainly that neither section names a parent who was never served at all — (a) speaks to personal service, (b) to citation by publication — and that the due-process argument from Peralta is an argument, not a settled exception.
- What we did not change
- The four-year figure is still correct for an ordinary conservatorship or possession order under Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 16.051, and it has not been replaced — only bounded. Nothing in these two sections affects a suit that did not terminate parental rights or grant an adoption.
- How it was missed
- Every sweep so far has searched for statements that are wrong. This one was an omission: every sentence on the page was accurate for the cases it described, and nothing on the page was false. No check enumerates the provisions that could bear on a claim and asks which are absent, so a missing adverse statute leaves no trace to find. It was surfaced by putting our own questions to four AI assistants and reading what they cited that we did not.
We called the amicus “acting as a witness” language older than the limits it contradicts. The same bill added it.
- What we said
- On amicus attorneys, of the phrase in § 107.001(1) describing an amicus’s role as “including by acting as a witness or making recommendations to the court”: “that language predates the limitations above and conflicts with them.”
- What is correct
- It does not predate them. Section 1 of H.B. 2530 added that phrase, where it appears as underlined new text in the enrolled bill. It took effect 1 September 2025 — the same day, and by the same Act, as the § 107.027(a) limits it sits against. Section 6 of that Act added § 107.027; section 1 amended the definition. The conflict is contemporaneous, not left over.
- Why it mattered
- “Predates” makes the definition sound vestigial — stale wording the legislature forgot to clean up, which is the easiest version of the argument to wave away. A phrase enacted the same day as the limits it contradicts is a materially stronger objection, and it is the one an opposing attorney would actually make. A reader relying on our framing would have been under-prepared for it.
- What changed
- The sentence now says the language was added by section 1 of the same Act and sits against the limitations, rather than predating them. The substantive reading is unchanged: a specific operative prohibition in § 107.027(a)(5)–(6) controls over a general definitional clause, and an amicus still may not submit a report into evidence or testify outside the narrow exceptions.
- How it was missed
- The note in this page’s own source already had it right — it says § 107.001(1) was “amended by the same Act.” Only the sentence a reader sees was wrong. Our checks compare pages against sources and against each other; nothing compares a page’s visible prose against a correction note sitting in the same file’s comments, so the two disagreed for as long as both existed.
- Also fixed
- On Rule 239a, the rule’s final sentence was quoted as “shall not affect the finality of the judgment” in the body and in a section heading. The rule reads “does not affect the finality of the judgment.” The legal effect is identical, but it was presented as a verbatim quotation and was not one; the wording appears to be from the rule before restyling. Two other passages on the same page already quoted it correctly, as did TRCP 239.
We told parents an amicus owes their child no confidentiality. For most of our readers, that is wrong.
- What we said
- On amicus attorneys: “the amicus is not the child’s lawyer and owes the child no confidentiality either.” The comparison table on the same page answered Owes child confidentiality? with a flat No. On attorney ad litem, in the visible text and inside the FAQ schema: “The amicus assists the court and owes no confidentiality.”
- What is correct
- That is the law only for a suit filed on or after 1 September 2025. H.B. 2530 (89th Leg., R.S.) repealed § 107.005, but section 8 of the Act continues the former law in effect for suits filed before that date. Under the former law, § 107.005(c) barred an amicus from disclosing a child’s communications unless the amicus determined that disclosure was necessary to assist the court in protecting the child’s best interests. Both regimes are live right now, and which one applies turns on nothing but the filing date.
- Why it mattered
- This site is read by people with older cases — that is close to its entire audience. Most of the parents reading that sentence were on the earlier side of the line, and were told the opposite of the rule that applied to them. A parent who believed their child had no protection might reasonably have coached the child, or stayed silent with them, or decided the conversation was pointless. It is advice-shaped text on a question where being wrong changes what a parent does.
- What changed
- Both pages now state the rule by filing date rather than flatly. On the amicus page the sentence is rewritten, the table cell now reads “No — but only for suits filed on or after 1 Sept 2025”, and a note under the table explains the split and tells the reader to check their filing date. On the ad litem page the answer is corrected in the visible text and in the FAQ schema, which is the copy search engines read.
- What we did not change
- The statement that you — the parent — are owed no confidentiality is correct under both versions and is unchanged. So is the neighbouring point, already qualified by date on 23 August, that an amicus may not submit a report into evidence or testify except as narrowly authorised.
- How we found it
- It was identified on 22 August 2026 and only partly fixed. The August work corrected the two claims that were wrong under both regimes and left this one, which is wrong under only one, recorded as open. It stayed open for eight days. What moved it was traffic: the amicus page became the most-read page on the site after being shared, which meant more people reading the wrong half. The defect did not change; the number of people meeting it did.
- What this says about our checks
- Nothing here detects a legal claim that has gone stale, and nothing flagged this. Our automated checks compare pages against sources and against each other; a sentence that is correct-sounding, correctly cited, and wrong only for cases filed before a particular date leaves no trace for them to compare. This is the third instance of the same shape — text that was true when written, tied to an authority it never declared a dependency on, with the wrong version sitting in structured data where it is hardest to see.
Our privacy policy described a Meta Pixel that had already been removed
- What we said
- The privacy policy described, in the present tense, a Meta (Facebook) Pixel running on this site: what it reported to Meta on every page load, how Meta could match it to a Facebook or Instagram account, which nine pages it was absent from, and how to block it. It was also listed under Third-Party Services as “Advertising measurement.”
- What is correct
- The pixel was removed on 27 August 2026. It ran here for five days, from 22 to 27 August 2026, and nothing on this site has sent anything to Meta since. The policy went on describing it as live for three days after it was gone.
- What changed
- The policy now describes the pixel in the past tense, with the dates it ran, and says plainly that nothing goes to Meta today. The Third-Party Services entry is removed, because Meta is no longer one. The section was rewritten rather than deleted: the pixel did collect for five days, that data is held by Meta and we cannot delete it, so a reader who visited in that window is entitled to know it happened and to be pointed at their Meta ad preferences. Quietly removing a disclosure of collection that actually occurred is the same failure as never having disclosed it.
- Why the pixel was removed
- There was no advertising campaign consuming it. It was collecting into a named identity graph with nothing on the other side of the scale — a cost to readers with no corresponding use. The code is out of this site’s JavaScript and both Meta origins are out of the Content-Security-Policy, so it cannot load even if a page requested it.
- How we found it
- It was known when the pixel was removed, recorded at the time, and left standing for three days. The removal was made on 27 August; the policy edit was held because this site had halted content changes pending a legal review, and the policy over-disclosed rather than under-disclosed — it described more surveillance than was happening, not less. That was the right way round to be wrong, but it was still false, and three days is longer than it should have taken.
- What now prevents it recurring
scripts/check-pixel-scope.mjsused to assert where the pixel was not. With no pixel anywhere, that check could no longer fail, so it has been replaced with a stronger one: no Meta Pixel marker may appear anywhere in the served tree — 142 files plus the CSP, scanned on every build. If the pixel is ever restored, the build fails until the privacy policy, the CSP and this log are updated in the same commit. The old assertions were retired deliberately and the reason is recorded in that file, rather than deleted to make the build pass.- Why it mattered
- This is the page that tells readers what happens to them when they visit, on a site read by people in custody disputes, some of whom take deliberate steps not to be identifiable. A privacy policy that is out of date in the reassuring direction is a familiar failure; one that is out of date in the alarming direction still tells the reader something untrue about their own exposure, and invites them to take a precaution they no longer need.
We told attorneys the authorship disclaimer was on every page. It is on 13 of 75.
- What we said
- The page addressed to attorneys said this site “is written by one of them, not by an attorney, and it says so on every page,” linking that phrase to our editorial standards.
- What is correct
- The standing disclaimer — “written by a pro se litigant, not a lawyer, and not reviewed by a licensed attorney” — appears in the markup of 13 of 75 pages. It is not injected at runtime; no such text exists anywhere in this site’s JavaScript, so the count in the source is the count a reader gets. Among the pages without it are Bill of Review and default judgment, two of the most-read legal explanations here.
- What changed
- The sentence now says the disclosure is in our editorial standards, which is where it actually is, and stops asserting a property of every page. Nothing else on the page changed.
- What we did not change
- The disclaimer is still absent from 62 pages, and this entry does not fix that. Putting it on all of them is a change to more than sixty files and needs a written rule saying which pages carry it plus a check that enforces the rule — without those, it drifts back out of alignment and nothing reports it. An automated rewrite across every page in this repository has broken this site before. That work is scheduled separately; until it lands, treat the editorial standards page as the disclosure and the per-page notice as present on some pages rather than all.
- How we found it
- While reviewing how this site describes itself, before asking other organisations to link to it. The claim was checked because it was about to be read by librarians evaluating whether to cite us, not because anything flagged it. Nothing here checks whether the site’s statements about its own behaviour are still true — our checks compare pages against sources and against each other, and a sentence describing what the site does leaves no trace for them to compare. That gap is known and this is an instance of it.
- Why it mattered
- It was on the page written for lawyers, the readers most likely to verify a claim like that, and the easiest kind of claim to disprove — open two pages and look. A site whose argument rests on asking people to check the record against primary sources cannot afford to be wrong about something a reader can falsify in ten seconds.
Our privacy policy did not disclose data we were collecting
- What we said
- The privacy policy described automatic collection as two things: Google Analytics, and “Server logs: Our hosting provider (Netlify) may collect standard server log data including IP addresses, browser type, and pages requested.” Under Information We Do Not Collect it listed selling data and payment information. It said nothing else about what this site recorded about visitors.
- What is correct
- From 7 January to 12 April 2026 this site ran a counter-surveillance module that wrote to its own database — not the hosting provider’s logs — for every visitor it fired on. It recorded IP address, user agent, referring page, page visited, screen resolution, timezone, HTTP headers, scroll depth, time on page, form interaction, and three browser fingerprints: a general fingerprint, a canvas hash and an audio hash. It retained 4,874 sessions. A second table recorded 8,606 requests to decoy paths, with IP, user agent, referrer and the raw request body.
Canvas and audio fingerprinting identify a browser by characteristics of the device rather than by cookies. They are the techniques that still work when someone is using private browsing or Tor. This site links to domestic violence hotlines and is read by people in custody disputes. Some of those readers took deliberate steps not to be identifiable, and this site attempted to identify them anyway. The policy disclosed none of it. - The exposure, stated at its widest supportable bound
- One of the two tables was readable by anyone holding this site’s public database key. That key was published in the membership page’s source from 1 January to 2 August 2026. Direct measurement confirms the table was readable on 29 July 2026. When it became readable cannot be established: PostgreSQL does not record when a policy was created.
So the window is at minimum four days — 29 July to 2 August, when the key was still published and the table was measurably open — and at maximum seven months. The upper bound cannot be excluded, and we are not going to describe it as briefer than we can prove.
If you visited this site between January and April 2026, the reasonable assumption is that a record of that visit existed and may have been readable by a third party. - What changed
- Collection stopped on 12 April 2026 when the module was removed; no code in this site has written to either table since, and none is capable of it. On 26 August 2026 the permissive read policy was removed and both tables were restricted to server-side access, with the underlying table grants revoked as a second layer. Verified from outside afterwards: the public key returns zero rows and is refused at the grant layer.
- What we did not change
- The 4,874 sessions and 8,606 request records still exist. They are retained because the operator of this site is a party to pending litigation and is subject to a duty to preserve records that may be relevant to it — a duty he has himself invoked, having served a preservation demand on an opposing party in one of those cases. Having identified this data as the kind of thing that could be sought in discovery, destroying it now is not available. The obligation runs both ways, so the records stay. They are restricted to server-side access and are not being used for anything.
- How we found it
- Not by reviewing the collection, which nobody had looked at since April. It surfaced during an unrelated security audit on 26 August 2026, when the database’s permission set was compared against a file written months earlier describing what those permissions were supposed to be. The two did not match.
A separate file, written 29 July 2026, had already identified and measured the readable table. It was never applied and never committed — it sat on a local disk, hidden from version control by a rule that excluded every.sqlfile. It was correct, it was four weeks old, and nothing made anyone look at it again. That is recorded here because it is the more useful failure: the problem was not that nobody noticed. Someone noticed, twice, and wrote it down twice. Noticing produced a file instead of a change. - Why it mattered
- A privacy policy that describes less collection than actually occurred is worse than the collection. This site asks readers to check its claims against primary sources. A policy that was inaccurate for three months is exactly the kind of thing that belongs here rather than being brought quietly into line — a revision on its own would leave no record that the document had ever diverged from what the site was doing.
Twenty-six pages described proposed legislation without saying it was proposed
- What we said
- Twenty-six pages named the SAFE SAPCR Act in their own prose — including the homepage, the legislation page, about the project, the court-duty guide, other states and the press release — and none of them carried a statement of its status. A reader arriving from a search result had nothing on the page telling them whether the Act is law.
- What is correct
- The SAFE SAPCR Act is draft legislation. It has not been introduced, has not passed either chamber, and is not in effect. No Texas court applies any part of it today. That was always true and is stated in full on the legislation page; what was missing was any way for a reader who landed elsewhere to know it.
- What changed
- Every page whose prose names the Act now carries a status banner reading “Proposed — not Texas law”, placed ahead of the first call to action so it is read before anything asks the reader to act. Pages that only link to the Act do not carry it: a link label points at the page that explains the Act, while prose is the page speaking about the Act itself, and a disclaimer on a page that makes no legislative claim teaches readers to ignore disclaimers.
- How we found it
- Two checks in this site’s own suite have required this banner since August 2026. One reported it missing on 24 routes; the other asserts its position on the homepage and had been reporting green the whole time, because it had no banner to find a fault with. A rule that fails loudly gets read as a known issue. A rule that passes because its subject does not exist gets read as verification, which is the worse of the two, and it is why this was not noticed for a month.
- Also fixed
- The first version of the banner wrote its dash as the HTML entity
—. One check reads decoded text and matched it; the other strips tags without decoding entities, saw the literal characters—, and went on passing for a new reason. It was caught only by deliberately breaking the banner’s placement to confirm the check would notice. A check nobody has watched fail is not evidence that anything is right. - Why it mattered
- This site asks readers to distinguish what the law is from what it argues the law should be. Describing a bill that does not exist yet, on twenty-six pages, without marking it as a proposal, undercuts that distinction in exactly the place it matters most — and it does so for the reader who arrives on one page from a search and never sees the rest of the site.
An archived update dated the arrest to April 7, 2024. That was the booking date.
- What we said
- The case update of July 20, 2026 described “an April 7, 2024 arrest during a visitation” after which personal property was retrieved but service documents were allegedly withheld. Separately, the defense-filings page listed, among the arguments in a filed response, that “the 103-day timeline between successful personal service and the false certificate proves knowing fraud, not a mistake.”
- What is correct
- Personal service occurred on Saturday, April 6, 2024 at 6:15 p.m. The arrest followed the same evening. April 7 is the booking date — the date the Harris County Sheriff’s Office recorded the intake, not the date of the arrest and not the date of service. The interval between service and the Certificate of Last Known Address is therefore 104 days, not 103.
- How we found it
- The executed return of service was obtained from the court file on August 25, 2026. It is the process server’s sworn Affidavit of Service, filed April 15, 2024, and it records the date and the time. Until it was in hand, the only date available was the booking date, which is what the arrest record shows and what the pleadings had used. Two documents settled it: the server’s affidavit and a hotel folio from the same night.
- What changed
- The July 2026 update is an archived, dated document, so its sentence has not been altered. A correction is appended immediately after it instead. Rewriting a dated update in place would make the archive unreliable in a way that is worse than the error being fixed.
On the defense-filings page, the “103-day” figure is quoted from a filed court response and has not been changed either. Changing it would misquote the filing. A marker now points from that bullet to the reconciliation note below it, which was previously five lines further down the page with nothing linking them. - The filings themselves are wrong, and cannot be fixed
- The First Amended Petition, the Second Amended Petition, the Motion for New Trial and the Response to the Motion to Dismiss in Cause No. 2025-95850 all date personal service to April 7, 2024 and compute a 103-day gap. That suit reached final judgment on March 19, 2026 and the court’s plenary power expired on July 2, 2026, so there is no vehicle to amend them. Where this site quotes those documents it reproduces what they say and notes the discrepancy alongside.
- Why it mattered
- A one-day error, on the one date the whole argument turns on. The claim this site makes is that an attorney certified a decade-old address as current a fixed number of days after successfully serving the respondent somewhere else. A page that cannot keep that number straight across its own surfaces invites the reader to check nothing else — and the number was wrong in the direction that understated the gap.
- Standing qualifier
- The allegations described here are contested, no court has entered findings on them, and nothing in this entry should be read as established fact.
A page reported that the court denied a motion to dismiss. The court granted it, with prejudice, five months ago.
- What we said
- The defense-filings page carried the heading “Court’s Ruling: Motion to Dismiss Denied,” described the February 19, 2026 scheduling order and its 2027 trial date, and concluded: “The issuance of a full scheduling order and trial date indicates the court did not grant the motion to dismiss.”
- What is correct
- On March 19, 2026 the 189th District Court granted the Rule 91a motion, dismissed every claim in Cause No. 2025-95850 with prejudice, taxed costs against the plaintiff and awarded the defendants $1,500.00 in attorney’s fees. The order says “This is a final judgment.” A motion for new trial filed April 13, 2026 was overruled by operation of law on June 2, 2026, and the court’s plenary power expired thirty days after that. The suit is over and was lost.
- What changed
- The section now reports the dismissal, the fee award and the finality, and states plainly that no appeal was perfected. The scheduling order is kept, correctly placed as something that predates the ruling by a month and did not survive it. A note records that a Rule 91a motion is decided on the pleadings alone, so the dismissal is not a finding that any allegation was false — but it is equally not a finding that any allegation was true, and the page no longer implies the case was going to trial.
- How it was missed
- The inference was sound when it was written and was never revisited. A scheduling order issued on February 19 really did suggest the motion had not been granted; the ruling came on March 19. Every other page that mentions this suit was updated afterward — the homepage, the case study and the evidence timeline all say “dismissed with prejudice on 19 March 2026,” and this page’s own meta description refers to “the overruled new-trial motion.” The correction reached the metadata and the other pages and stopped at the visible heading of the page most specifically about it.
- Why it mattered
- This is the second time in two days that a sweep has been found to have updated everything around a claim while leaving the claim itself standing. The previous entry recorded an audit that deleted an API endpoint and left the prose that endpoint had served. This one is the same shape in the opposite direction: the disclosure was added everywhere it was easy to add and missed the one heading a reader would go to for the answer. A correction is not finished when the true statement appears somewhere; it is finished when the false statement is gone.
- Also fixed
- Three navigation links still read “Perjury Analysis” — on the homepage, on the extrinsic-fraud guide and on the defense-filings page itself — after yesterday’s entry renamed that page to “Documentary Comparison” and removed its criminal framing. The heading, breadcrumb and title had been changed; the links pointing at it had not. They now read “Documentary Comparison.”
- Standing qualifier
- The claims in Cause No. 2025-95850 were dismissed on the pleadings without a trial and without evidence. No court has found any allegation in that suit to be true, and none should be read as established fact.
Three pages described a criminal referral without saying that the District Attorney had declined it
- What we said
- The defense-filings page listed, among the arguments in a filed response, that “a criminal investigation by the Harris County Precinct 4 Constable’s Office (Incident #…) is active, and Elizabeth Alvarado has been referred for perjury prosecution.” The case study described the same referral and stopped there. A third page was built around it: headed “Perjury Analysis,” summarising “11 Documented False Statements,” and closing with the elements of Texas Penal Code §§ 37.02, 37.03 and 37.10.
- What is correct
- On March 20, 2026 the Harris County District Attorney’s Intake Bureau wrote that, based on the information and evidence in the report, “no charges will be filed or additional action taken by the District Attorney’s Office.” No criminal charge has been filed against any person in connection with this matter, and no court or agency has made any finding of misconduct. That letter was five months old and appeared nowhere on this site.
- What changed
- The “is active” bullet is gone and the police incident number is no longer published anywhere. The case study now states the outcome in its own block. The third page has been reframed from a criminal allegation to what it always actually was — a comparison of documents. Its label, breadcrumb and heading are now “Documentary Comparison”; “11 Documented False Statements” is now “11 Statements Contradicted by Contemporaneous Documents,” because documents can show a contradiction but cannot establish that a statement was false or knowingly made; and the Penal Code section was removed in full. Listing the elements of a crime beside a named private individual is the criminal frame, however carefully the caveat beneath it is written. All eleven document comparisons remain, unchanged.
- Also fixed
- The evidence timeline stated flatly that the March 2024 petition was “supported by perjured affidavits with no objective supporting discovery.” That sentence named two people and asserted a felony, with none of the “the pleadings allege” and “the defendants deny” framing this site applies everywhere else. It is now attributed to the pleadings, with the denial and the absence of findings in the same block.
- Why it mattered
- This is the highest-harm error a site like this one can make. Publishing that a named private individual is under an active criminal investigation, while the prosecuting authority has already declined to act, is not a matter of tone. It is a statement of present fact that had ceased to be true, about the one category of claim that does the most damage when it is wrong.
- How we found it
- An external analysis of the site was checked rather than believed. It was substantially wrong: its central conclusion rested on four phrases — “Kidnapping by Fraud,” “103-day fraud scheme,” “fraud scheme” and “coaching my son” — and not one of the four appears anywhere on this site. It also treated a media-outreach target list as references to third parties, and a judge named once for issuing a scheduling order as a privacy problem. But checking it turned up one real defect, and a sweep for that same shape — criminal-conduct language, a named individual, no qualifier in the block — found the rest.
- A known gap
- This material survived the audit of 21 August 2026 that deleted the
/api/criminal-referralendpoint, five routes and six functions, and verified twelve surfaces returning 404. That audit removed the machinery and left the prose. Endpoints are enumerable; sentences are not, and a claim does not stop being published because the API that once served it is gone. When a category of claim is withdrawn, the pages have to be swept too. - Standing qualifier
- Everything described in this entry concerns allegations in pending or concluded litigation. They are contested, no findings have been entered, and nothing here should be read as established fact.
Two statements about service in this case were contradicted by the court records
- What we said
- Two entries in the case study timeline, repeated on the press page and in the extrinsic fraud guide. The first, headed “No Return of Service Filed in the SAPCR Case,” said the docket in Cause No. 202417675 reflected no return of service for the April 7, 2024 service event, and cited that absence under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 107 as a basis for the pending Bill of Review. The second, headed “Respondent Appears in Court When Properly Served,” said respondent was “properly served at his actual address” in the related Habeas Corpus case, Cause No. 202353496.
- What is correct
- Neither holds up against the docket. The SAPCR docket does carry an entry for the return — a restricted entry dated April 15, 2024, titled “Citation/Temporary Restraining Order (Executed),” eight days after service. Its contents are restricted from public view and are the subject of subpoenas duces tecum in the Bill of Review, so the site can no longer say what it does or does not contain, and does not. In the Habeas case the opposite error: the District Clerk’s record shows citation to respondent’s New Orleans address was requested three times — August 16, 2023, December 27, 2023 and January 31, 2024, each reading “or anywhere found” — and never issued, each carrying the status “Service Assigned to Clerk/Not Issued.” He was never served in that case. He learned of the June 3, 2024 setting from a court notice mailed to that address and appeared anyway. Both entries have been rewritten to say what the record says.
- Why it mattered
- These were assertions about the court’s own file, on the two pages this site asks journalists and legislators to verify against that file. The first was checkable by anyone who pulled the docket, and would have been read as the site overstating a defect in its favour. The second understated the record in the site’s own disfavour: “properly served” concedes service that the clerk’s record shows never issued.
- How we found it
- A pass over the docket entries themselves rather than over the site’s prose. Both statements were written from recollection of the case rather than from the entries, and both had stood since the timeline was first published. No sweep searching for wrong text would have caught either one: the sentences were internally coherent and cited the correct cause numbers. Only the source records disagreed with them.
- What we did not change
- The descriptions further down the case study of what the March 2026 dismissal motion and the response to it argued are left as written. Those describe the contents of filings, and the filings say what they say; editing them would misstate the record rather than correct it. The general explanations of Rule 107 and of return-of-service defects on the Rule 239 page, the improper service guide and elsewhere are statements about the rule, not about this case, and are unaffected.
- Standing qualifier
- Everything described in this entry concerns allegations in pending litigation. They are contested, no findings have been entered, and nothing here should be read as established fact.
The homepage said there was no criminal penalty, and that only a lawsuit or a bill of review was available
- What we said
- The Problem section's third card read: “The only recourse for false certification is a full civil lawsuit or bill of review — which most parents cannot afford to bring. There is no automatic review, no criminal penalty, no expedited remedy.”
- What is correct
- Neither absolute survives this site's own record. On 2 August the reform section further down the same page was corrected to say that Penal Code § 37.10, tampering with a governmental record, may reach this conduct — that correction is logged below. The old sentence was also wrong that only two routes exist. A State Bar grievance reaches the attorney's conduct — the site links the grievance form from the homepage, states its own grievance as pending, and publishes a guide to filing one. It cannot vacate the order, which is why the card names it separately rather than adding it to the list. The card now states the gap without the absolutes: no offense is written for this conduct, one general statute may reach it, and neither court route begins on its own.
- Why it mattered
- These were the site's own strongest claims about why reform is needed, on the homepage, in visible prose, and each was disproved by a different part of the same page. A legislative reader checking either one would have found the contradiction without leaving the document.
- How we found it
- A verification pass over the whole Problem block rather than the two flagged sentences. This card had not been touched since 22 March 2026. The 2 August criminal-law correction changed exactly one line of the homepage, and the 3 August Rule 239a pass rewrote the card immediately above this one — both edited a neighbour and left this card standing.
- Also fixed
- The “Days Since Default Judgment” counter carried 706 in the page source. A browser never showed it — the figure is computed live and rendered 726 — but crawlers, AI retrieval and readers without JavaScript saw the frozen number, set on 27 July and drifting by one a day ever since. The commit that set it replaced two placeholders with that snapshot and added the no-JavaScript note in the same change — the note said “Over 700 days” and was still true twenty days later; the number beside it was wrong within a day. Both places now read “700+”, which is what the note had been saying correctly all along. A floor cannot go false. It does go uninformative: the count reaches 800 on 29 October 2026, which is recorded in the page source rather than left to be noticed.
- A known gap
- Three correction passes in three weeks have each missed defects of this kind, and they are all the same kind: a value that was true when written, tied to a source it never declared a dependency on, going stale with nothing watching. Every sweep so far has searched for wrong text. None of these contained wrong text. Detecting them needs checks on relationships — a header equal to its newest entry, a fallback that is a floor rather than a snapshot, an absolute claim registered against whatever would disprove it. One such check now exists, for the header of this page. Another has existed for the sitemap since 3 August and is called by nothing. Until they run automatically, this log records these after the fact rather than preventing them.
The translated pages described Bill of Review without its deadline
- What we said
- All eight translated pages — Arabic, German, Greek, Spanish, Hebrew, Hindi, Japanese and Chinese — explained what a Bill of Review is and listed its three elements, then stopped. None gave a deadline. None contained the digit 4, the word "four", or the word "year" in any language. None linked to any of the English guides that carry the limitations period; they linked only to the FAQ, the case study and each other.
- What is correct
- A bill of review must be filed within four years of the date the judgment was signed. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.051. Each translated page now states that deadline in its own language and links to the full English guide.
- Why it mattered
- These are indexed landing pages, not English pages with a language switcher. A parent can arrive on one directly, learn that a remedy exists, learn the three things it requires, and have no way to discover it expires. The Japanese page said "time is of the essence" without ever giving a number. This is the same shape as the glossary miss logged below: no false statement, harm by omission, and invisible to any sweep that searches for wrong phrases rather than missing ones.
- How we found it
- Extending the void-judgment proximity audit to the translated pages. On the audit's own terms they were clean — there are no void-judgment no-deadline claims in any of the eight, so there was nothing to qualify. The omission surfaced only because the audit asked what the pages say about deadlines at all.
- A correction to the audit itself
- The first run of that audit reported the Arabic page as missing the "103 days" figure. It was not. The page carries it as ١٠٣, in Eastern Arabic numerals, which an ASCII-only pattern cannot see. The same flaw made the deadline check unreliable for Arabic, Hindi, Japanese and Chinese until numerals were normalised. Recorded because a multilingual audit that silently fails on non-Latin scripts reports clean and is worth less than no audit at all.
- Not attorney-reviewed, and newly translated
- The added sentences were written for this change and have not been reviewed by a native speaker or by anyone licensed in Texas. The legal term Bill of Review is left untranslated on every page, as it already was. If any rendering is wrong, tell us and it will be corrected here.
The void-judgment qualification never reached the state pages or the glossary
- What we said
- Two claims sat more than ten sentences from their qualification. Illinois said a void judgment "may be challenged at any time with no time limit" and California, in its Key difference from Texas comparison, said a void judgment "can be attacked at any time under § 473(d), with no time limit." Both pages carried the standard qualifying paragraph, but eleven sentences later. Separately, the glossary defined Void Judgment as "legally invalid and has no effect" and said nothing further, and had no entry at all for collateral attack — a term used on seven pages and the one the whole qualification turns on.
- What is correct
- Unchanged in substance from July 28 and August 8: whether a judgment is void is the contested question, not the deadline. A collateral attack with no deadline requires the defect to be apparent from the face of the record. PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 272–73 (Tex. 2012). Both state-page claims now carry the qualification in place with a link to the fuller discussion on the same page. The glossary entry for Void Judgment carries it too, and Collateral Attack now exists as its own entry.
- Why it mattered
- This is the third pass at the same error and the second time the fix was reported complete while instances remained. July 28 said "a sitewide sweep confirms no unhedged version remains"; August 8 found one in Bill of Review. Both of those sweeps looked only at Texas pages and at prose. The state pages and the glossary were never in scope, and a reader who arrives on glossary looking up what "void" means is precisely the reader the qualification was written for.
- How we found it
- A proximity audit rather than a presence check: every sentence containing both "void" and a no-deadline phrase, tested for a qualifier within three sentences either side, across prose, JSON-LD, the chatbot knowledge base,
llms.txtand the state pages. Forty claims checked. A presence check would have passed both pages, because both already contained the qualifying paragraph somewhere on the page — which is the same failure mode the August 8 entry describes. - What we did not change
- The rhetorical questions "Is there really no deadline for a void judgment?" on Overturn a Custody Order and "Does a void judgment really have no deadline?" on the deadline calculator read as unqualified in isolation, including in their FAQ structured data. Their answers correct the misconception immediately and were left alone; flattening a question whose answer is the correction would make both pages worse. Pennsylvania was left alone for the same reason — its claim is qualified by "only requires facial defect" in the preceding sentence.
- A note for the next sweep
- This page will always fail a void-judgment audit. The entries below quote the old unqualified wording verbatim, because that is what a corrections log is for. Those quotations must never be "fixed." Doing so would erase the record that the error existed. The same applies to
llms-full.txt, which inlines this page.
The FAQ answered "is this legal?" with a flat no
- What we said
- Asked "I didn't know about my custody case until after the judgment. Is this legal?", the FAQ answered: "No, it violates your constitutional due process rights. The 14th Amendment guarantees you notice and opportunity to be heard." The same wording sat in the page's FAQ structured data, which is the text search results and AI assistants quote.
- What is correct
- It depends on how you were served. Due process requires notice reasonably calculated to reach you, not notice that actually reached you. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Where the citation was served in compliance with the rules, a default judgment can stand even though the respondent never saw it. The constitutional problem arises where service itself was defective — substituted service or service by publication obtained on an address the petitioner had reason to know was wrong.
- Why it mattered
- Not knowing about a case does not by itself establish a due process violation, and a parent told otherwise may believe they hold an automatic constitutional claim they do not have. Rule 239a and improper service already stated the Mullane standard correctly, so the site contradicted itself on the question a reader is most likely to arrive with.
- Also fixed
- Six stray spaces before punctuation in the FAQ structured data, left behind when inline formatting was stripped during generation, which had made five other answers differ from their visible text. All fourteen question-and-answer pairs now match the page exactly.
The bar grievance page described the wrong tribunal
- What we said
- How to File a Bar Complaint stated that an attorney who does not accept recommended discipline receives a "Petition and Notice of Alleged Violation" and that the case "goes to a hearing at the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH)," followed by a Proposal for Decision and a Commission Final Order. It listed the available sanctions as "monetary fines, license suspension, or license revocation."
- What is correct
- None of that is the attorney discipline process. Under Rule 2.15 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, once a matter proceeds the attorney has 20 days to elect either an evidentiary panel of a district grievance committee or a district court — the first confidential with a private reprimand as the least severe sanction, the second public with a public reprimand as the least severe. SOAH has no role in attorney discipline. Sanctions run from private reprimand and public reprimand through suspension to disbarment, and may include restitution and costs. The page was also missing the Summary Disposition Panel step, which convenes when just cause is not found and from which Rule 2.13 permits no appeal in either direction.
- Why it mattered
- A reader deciding whether to file was told their grievance would be heard by the wrong tribunal, under the wrong procedure, with the wrong sanctions available. The page's own structured data had carried the correct sanction list the entire time, so the site was contradicting itself in a way no reader could see.
- How we found it
- Checking every claim on the page against primary sources before adding a FAQ section. Search Console showed bar-complaint queries rising from zero to the largest share of the site's impressions in the week to August 5, which made this the most-read page on the site while it carried the error.
The July 28 void-judgment sweep missed one paragraph
- What we said
- The July 28 entry below stated that a sitewide sweep confirmed no unhedged version of the "void judgment can be attacked at any time" claim remained. One did. In its Rule 329b section, Bill of Review still said the Bill of Review is the exclusive remedy "unless the judgment is void — in which case the court may declare it void at any time," without qualification.
- What is correct
- Unchanged from July 28: a no-deadline attack requires the defect to be apparent from the face of the record. PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 272–73 (Tex. 2012). Plan around four years. That paragraph now carries the qualification in place, with a link to the full discussion further down the page.
- Why it mattered
- The correction sat ninety lines below the error. A reader landing on that paragraph through a search snippet, or an AI assistant quoting it in isolation, would carry away the claim the July 28 entry was written to retract — the exact failure mode that entry described.
- Also fixed
- The section heading read "Void Custody Judgments: When There Really Is No Time Limit" and now reads "The Narrow ‘No Time Limit’ Exception." The old heading asserted the thing the section spends two paragraphs qualifying.
Outreach email overstated the separation by 366 days
- What we said
- Automated outreach email to legislators and to press gave the separation as
951+ days
, in both the subject line and the body. The legislator subject line readTexas SAPCR Fraud: Father Separated 951+ Days
; the press subject line and the body of both messages carried the same figure. - What is correct
- The separation began 27 December 2024. The correct figure at the time of the error was 585 days. The code calculated from 27 December 2023 — a year early — so every figure it produced was 366 days too high, an overstatement of roughly 63%.
- Why it mattered
- This is the single number the outreach leads with, and it overstated the central hardship claim in advocacy mail asking legislators to sponsor a bill. This project's whole argument is that it is more careful with facts than the process it criticises; an inflated figure in a legislator's inbox undercuts that directly. Five legislators received the 951 figure before it was caught. The corrected figure now appears in all outreach, so anyone comparing the two will see a number that fell by 366 days — which is why it is logged here rather than quietly changed.
- Also fixed
- Both templates referred to a single child —
my daughter
,his daughter
, andfrom Daughter
in the press subject line. There are two children, a son and a daughter. Corrected throughout. - What we did not change
- The date 27 December 2023 appears in ten other places across the case APIs, evidence, perjury analysis and public records. Those refer to a different event — the habeas petition filed that day listing the correct address, which is one of the load-bearing facts in the case. Same digits, different fact. Only the three files computing days-since-separation were changed.
- Fixed on
- The two outreach mailers and the outreach statistics endpoint. Verified by rendering both emails directly from the source files, with the date, subject and body all read from the code rather than restated, so the check cannot drift from what is actually sent.
The homepage and glossary still placed Rule 239a before service
- What we said
- The homepage stated that Rule 239a
requires a Certificate of Last Known Address before alternative service
. The Glossary defined the rule asrequiring attorneys to file a Certificate of Last Known Address before service by publication or posting can be authorized
. - What is correct
- Rule 239a operates at or immediately before a default judgment is rendered, at the end of a case. It is post-judgment notice, not a precondition of service, and it applies to any default judgment however service was attempted.
- Why it mattered
- This is the same error corrected across nine pages on 2 August, and it is the misconception the flagship page calls
the most common and most costly misunderstanding
. The site was still teaching it on the homepage while correcting it one click away. A reader could conclude the rule had no bearing on a default that followed personal service — which is the situation this project exists to document. - How it was missed
- The 2 August sweep searched for phrasings containing
publication
and never searchedalternative service
, so these two instances were missed and reported as fixed. Found by an external reviewer. The sweep has been rerun against both phrasings.
The Act's expedited hearing deadline was given as 45 days on five pages and 60 on another
- What we said
- Seven places described the SAFE SAPCR Act's expedited bill-of-review hearing as a 45-day requirement — the homepage (twice in visible text and once inside FAQ schema), the legislative brief, Get Started, and two dated case updates. The Act's own section-by-section analysis said 60 days.
- What is correct
- 60 days. That is the figure in the section-by-section analysis, which is the controlling statement of the proposal; the 45-day references were summaries that were never updated when the drafting changed. All seven now read 60.
- Why it mattered
- The two figures sat on pages a legislative reader would open in the same sitting — the one-page brief and the full bill analysis. A proposal that cannot state its own deadline consistently invites the question of what else in it has not been checked. The version inside FAQ schema was the worse half, since that is the text search engines and AI assistants quote.
- Fixed on
- Five references corrected — the homepage (FAQ schema and visible text changed together, parity verified), the legislative brief and Get Started. No page now carries the 45-day figure as a current statement of the proposal.
- What we did not change
- The two dated case updates of 22 June and 20 July still read 45 days, because that is what they said when they were published. Dated posts are not rewritten after the fact. Each now carries a note recording that the figure was later corrected and pointing to the current one. Silently editing an archived post is the practice this log exists to make unnecessary — a reader who finds an old figure should be able to see that it was superseded, not find a tidied version that hides the change.
Rule 239a was described incorrectly on nine pages
- What we said
- Every page said the certificate lists a last known mailing address. FAQ placed the filing "before service by publication" — at the start of a case. Four pages — Glossary, the homepage, Get Started and the response checklist — limited the rule to defaults following service by publication.
- What is correct
- The rule requires certifying the last known email address and mailing address. It operates at or immediately before the judgment is rendered, not at the start of the case. And it applies to any default judgment, however service was attempted. Verified against the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as published.
- Why it mattered
- The scope error was the serious one. This site's documented case involves defective personal service, not publication — so a parent in exactly that position could have read the homepage and concluded Rule 239a did not apply to them. The timing error was worse in one respect: it sat inside FAQ schema, which is the text search engines and AI assistants quote, and it taught the precise misconception the flagship page calls "the most common and most costly misunderstanding."
- Fixed on
- Seventeen edits across nine pages, with FAQ schema and visible text changed together and parity verified on all four pages carrying both. A sitewide sweep confirms no page still describes the certificate as mailing-address-only.
The homepage cited a criminal statute that does not cover this conduct
- What we said
- The proposed-reform section stated that a knowingly false address certification is "a state jail felony … under Penal Code § 32.47," enhanced to a third-degree felony where the false statement is made to obtain custody. Perjury Analysis separately listed § 32.46 among the applicable statutes.
- What is correct
- Section 32.47 is Fraudulent Destruction, Removal, or Concealment of Writing. It punishes destroying or concealing a writing, not filing a false one; it expressly excludes governmental records, which is what a court filing is; its base grade is a Class A misdemeanor; and the custody enhancement described does not exist. The provision that may reach this conduct is § 37.10, tampering with a governmental record, which requires no oath — the distinction that matters, since a Rule 239a certificate is not sworn.
- Why it mattered
- It told readers a criminal penalty exists today that does not, and it contradicted this site's own legislation page, which correctly says current law contains no specific offence and that the Act would create one. A legislative reader who checked the citation would have found four errors in one sentence.
- Fixed on
- Homepage and Perjury Analysis. Every Penal Code citation on the site was then checked against the code as published; the rest were correct.
S.B. 2794 was described as law, and its penalties as a toughening
- What we said
- The homepage and case study presented S.B. 2794 as enacted, with an effective date. The homepage separately summarised it as a "three-strikes structure — penalties escalating from misdemeanor to felony."
- What is correct
- S.B. 2794 passed the Senate on 12 May 2025 and never received a House floor vote. It did not become law and has no effective date. On penalties: Penal Code § 25.03(d) already makes custody interference a state jail felony, with no tiering. The bill would have lowered a first or second offence to a Class C misdemeanor while broadening who could be charged.
- Why it mattered
- Stating that a bill took effect when it died is the kind of error that ends a conversation with legislative staff. The penalty framing was worse in substance: on a site arguing for stronger consequences, it described a bill as toughening the law when at the low end it did the opposite.
- Fixed on
- Homepage and case study, verified against Texas Legislature Online bill history. The homepage now states the current penalty as a baseline so the comparison is legible.
- How it was missed
- On 3 August 2026 the same error was found still standing on the legislative brief, which said the bill “strengthened penalties.” The 2 August sweep searched for the bill number and the claimed effective date; the brief's sentence carried neither — it asserted passage only through a past-tense verb. Corrected there, and the brief now carries the full action history: reported favourably without amendment from House committee on 21 May 2025, sent to Calendars 23 May, never set for a floor vote. That the bill cleared one chamber and drew no committee amendment in the other is an argument for refiling it, and is why the correct history is worth stating precisely rather than summarising as “it failed.”
The amicus attorney page cited a Family Code section that does not exist
- What we said
- Amicus Attorney cited § 107.005 for the amicus's duty to advocate the child's best interests and for not being bound by the child's wishes, and § 107.003 for the interview duties.
- What is correct
- There is no § 107.005 — Chapter 107 runs from 107.0045 to 107.006. Both duties are now § 107.0265. Section 107.003 governs attorneys ad litem and does not reach amicus attorneys. H.B. 2530, effective 1 September 2025, moved the amicus provisions into their own sections; the page still described the previous scheme.
- Why it mattered
- A parent or attorney following the citation would have found nothing at all. The page also omitted that these duties are subject to limits set in the appointment order under § 107.024, which is the practical point for someone facing an amicus.
- Fixed on
- Amicus Attorney. All sixty-nine Family Code citations on the site were then checked against the code as published; the rest were correct.
Five legislator phone links dialled the wrong number
- What we said
- On Find Your Legislator, five California Assembly entries displayed a correct number but linked to a different one. District 3 showed 916-319-2003 and dialled 916-319-0003. The same fault affected districts 16, 17, 25 and 26 — the link was built by padding the district number with a zero instead of the correct prefix digit.
- What is correct
- All 76 phone links now dial exactly what they display. Verified programmatically: zero mismatches.
- Why it mattered
- Anyone tapping the link on a phone reached a wrong number. On a page whose only purpose is helping people contact their representative, a link that silently misdials defeats the page.
- Also fixed
- Nine phone numbers elsewhere on the site were displayed as plain text and were not tappable, including the National Domestic Violence Hotline on the homepage and on Temporary Restraining Orders. On a phone, a crisis number you cannot tap is a number you have to retype.
Two pages told readers a void judgment can be challenged "at any time"
- What we said
- Bill of Review carried a section headed "Void Custody Judgments in Texas: No Time Limit" stating that a void judgment "can be attacked at any time." Default Judgments repeated the claim in six places, including inside its FAQ answers — which are the text search engines and AI assistants are most likely to quote.
- What is correct
- A no-deadline collateral attack requires the defect to be apparent from the face of the record. PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 272–73 (Tex. 2012). Where a return of service recites valid service, the record looks regular and proving otherwise takes evidence from outside it — which means a bill of review inside the four-year period. Plan around four years.
- Why it mattered
- This is the most consequential error the site has carried. A parent who reads "no time limit" and waits can lose the only remedy they had. Three other pages — improper service, no response, and the eligibility checker — already debunked the claim, so the site was contradicting itself on the single question a reader is most likely to act on.
- Fixed on
- Both pages, including the FAQ schema on Default Judgments so the corrected wording is what gets quoted. A sitewide sweep confirms no unhedged version remains.
Bill of Review filing date was wrong by 17 days
- What we said
- The case timeline dated the Bill of Review to December 29, 2025 and described it in the same entry as the civil suit against opposing counsel, implying both were filed together.
- What is correct
- The original Bill of Review (Cause No. 202592876, 311th District Court) was filed December 12, 2025, together with an Ex Parte Emergency Motion for Temporary Possession. The civil suit (Cause No. 2025-95850, 189th District Court) was filed separately on December 29, 2025. They are different proceedings in different courts.
- How we found it
- The July 20, 2026 filings state the December 12 date in three places. The site had also begun contradicting itself, since a newer entry already used the correct date.
- Fixed on
- Case Study — the entry is now split in two.
A residential address was still published on the evidence page
- What we said
- The evidence timeline reproduced a complete residential address — street, unit, city, ZIP — in a 2013 record entry. Other pages had already removed it, and we had described the site as no longer publishing it. That description was wrong; this instance was live.
- What is correct
- The address does not appear anywhere on this site. The 2013 entry still makes its point — that the address was recorded with two misspellings in a case that was dismissed — without reproducing the address to make it.
- Why it mattered
- The residence is occupied by unrelated third parties who have no connection to this dispute. Publishing it served no purpose that could not be served by describing it.
- Fixed on
- Evidence Timeline, plus wording aligned across Case Study, the homepage, Extrinsic Fraud and Rule 239a.
Homepage advertised a trial date for a dismissed case
- What we said
- The homepage social-sharing description read "Cause No. 2025-95850, set for trial Feb 2027."
- What is correct
- That case was dismissed with prejudice in March 2026. The description now cites the Bill of Review, Cause No. 202592876, set for trial October 19, 2026 — the proceeding that is actually live.
- Fixed on
- Homepage metadata.
Description of the abandoned address was weaker than the record supports
- What we said
- That the respondent "had not occupied" the certified address since December 31, 2013.
- What is correct
- The First Amended Bill of Review states the address was abandoned by both parties in 2013, eleven years before the SAPCR was filed. This is a material difference: it means the certifying side had also lived there and left.
- Note
- This was an understatement rather than an inaccuracy, but it changed the meaning of a central factual claim, so it is logged.
Reporting an Error
If anything on this site is inaccurate, tell us. We need:
- The page URL
- The specific sentence or claim
- What you believe is correct
- Supporting documentation where you have it — a cause number, a filing, a statute section
Send it through our contact page. For sensitive material, PGP-encrypted email and Signal are available.
What happens next: we verify against the primary source. If you are right, we fix the page, log it here with the date, and say what changed. We do not require you to identify yourself, and we will not publish who reported an error unless you ask us to.
What We Will Not Do
- Silently edit. Substantive changes get logged here.
- Rewrite dated case updates. Dated posts stay as filed; superseded ones carry a notice pointing forward. Rewriting history to look consistent is the opposite of a record.
- Remove accurate information because it is unwelcome. We correct errors. Accuracy is the standard, not comfort.
Related
- Editorial Standards — what we publish and what we don't
- Research Methodology — how records are obtained and verified
- Contact — report an error
- Latest Case Update
- About SAFE SAPCR Texas