Texas Rule 239a (TRCP 239a) — Certificate of Last Known Address

Proposed — not Texas law The SAFE SAPCR Act is draft legislation. It has not been introduced, has not passed either chamber, and is not in effect. Nothing on this page describes a rule a Texas court applies today.

Certificate of Last Known Address in Default Judgments

Looking for Rule 239 instead? Rule 239a (this page) is the certificate of last known address filed after a default judgment. Rule 239 is the rule that allows the default to be taken in the first place, including the ten-day return-of-service requirement.

A note on the name. The rule’s official caption in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure is “Rule 239a. Notice of Default Judgment.” “Certificate of Last Known Address” is the working name practitioners use, taken from the document the rule requires, and it is what this page uses because it is what people search for. If you are pulling the rule text yourself, look for the official caption.

Last updated: August 26, 2026

In short.

  • Rule 239a governs the notice mailed after a default judgment is signed. It is not service of process.
  • The rule requires certifying a last known address but requires no verification that the address is current.
  • Failure to comply does not void the judgment — but it can extend your deadlines and support a challenge.
  • Which remedy you have depends almost entirely on how long ago the judgment was signed.

What Rule 239a Requires

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 239a requires the party taking a default judgment, or their attorney, to certify to the clerk in writing the defendant's last known email address and mailing address, at or immediately before the judgment is rendered. The clerk must then send written notice of the signed judgment — electronically as provided in Rule 21(f)(10), and by mail to the address shown in the certificate — and note the fact of that mailing on the docket.

The rule was amended to add the email address. That added a second thing to certify; it did not add any duty to check either one. It also does little for the person this page is about: a defendant who never appeared has no email address on file with the court, and the commentary to Rule 21(f)(10) acknowledges that where no address has been provided, electronic compliance is impossible and the clerk should use another method. For a defaulted party, everything still turns on the mailing address written on the certificate.

The rule directs that the certificate be filed among the papers in the cause; that the clerk mail notice immediately upon signing; that the notice state the number and style of the case, the court, the names of the parties in whose favor and against whom judgment was rendered, and the date of signing; and that failure to comply with the rule "shall not affect the finality of the judgment."

Rule 239a Is Not Service of Process

This is the most common and most costly misunderstanding, so it is worth stating plainly: a Rule 239a certificate is not evidence that anyone was ever served.

Service of process is what gives a Texas court personal jurisdiction over a defendant. It happens at the beginning of a case and is governed by an entirely different set of rules — Rule 99 (issuance and form of citation), Rule 103 (who may serve), Rule 106 (method of service), Rule 107 (the return of service), and Rule 109 (service by publication). Rule 239a operates at the end of the case and does one narrow thing: it tells the clerk where to mail a courtesy notice that judgment has been entered.

A case can therefore contain a perfectly regular-looking Rule 239a certificate and still rest on service that was never valid. The two documents prove different things, and a certificate filed months after a citation was returned proves nothing about whether that citation reached anyone.

Key Aspects of TRCP 239a

The Verification Gap

Rule 239a contains no requirement that the certifying party verify the address is accurate or current. A certificate can list an address that is years or decades old, and the court accepts it at face value. There is no cross-check against the return of service, against addresses used elsewhere in the same case, or against any public database.

The practical consequence is that a party who successfully served someone at one address can later certify a completely different, outdated address — and nothing in the rule's machinery catches the discrepancy. The clerk mails to the address on the certificate. The letter goes wherever it goes. The judgment becomes final on schedule.

This is a design gap rather than a loophole in the ordinary sense. Rule 239a was written on the assumption that the certifying party has no incentive to misdirect the notice. In contested custody litigation, that assumption does not always hold.

What "Shall Not Affect the Finality" Actually Means

People often read the finality clause as making Rule 239a unenforceable. That is not quite right. The clause means a defective or missing notice does not, by itself, automatically undo the judgment — you cannot simply point at the failure and have the order vacated.

What the failure does do is potentially significant:

In other words, the clause forecloses an automatic remedy. It does not make the failure irrelevant.

What the Courts Have Actually Done With Rule 239a

The paragraph above describes what the finality clause means. This section reports what Texas courts have done with it, because a reader deciding whether to spend money on a challenge deserves the losses as well as the wins.

A full-text search of published Texas opinions returns 92 opinion records that mention Rule 239a — 83 distinct cases once duplicate records for the same decision are removed. Four of those 83 are family-law cases. The rule is litigated regularly in commercial disputes and almost never by parents.

A Rule 239a failure, by itself, does not undo a judgment

This is not a gap in the case law. Courts say it directly, because the rule tells them to.

In Matter of Marriage of Collins, 870 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1994, no writ), a divorce respondent argued the court failed to give him notice of the default judgment. The court quoted Rule 239a and held: This rule provides notification to a defendant that a default judgment has been entered against him so that he may pursue his post judgment remedies. Failure to notify does not result in reversible error.

Thirty-two years later, nothing had changed. In In the Interest of I.J.W. and M.R.W., No. 08-25-00116-CV (Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 15, 2026) — a suit affecting the parent-child relationship — a father argued the Certificate of Last Known Address had been filed prematurely, before service. The court overruled him: Father provides no authoritative support for his argument that filing these documents “prematurely” invalidates the judgment. Furthermore, his argument ignores the last sentence of the Rule, which states that “[f]ailure to comply with the provisions of this rule does not affect the finality of the judgment.”

That is the most recent published SAPCR decision on this rule, and it is a loss for the parent. Anyone considering a standalone Rule 239a challenge should read it first.

Where a false certification did matter

Katy Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., 469 S.W.3d 160, 163–65 (Tex. 2015), is the case that shows what does work. The plaintiff obtained a default judgment for more than 20,000 and, in the Supreme Court’s words, certified the Katy entities’ outdated registered address as their “last known mailing address.” The clerk then mailed notice of the default judgment to the registered address, and the Katy entities did not receive it. The judgment became final shortly thereafter.

The defendants filed an equitable bill of review. The Court held they had raised a genuine issue of material fact, reversed the court of appeals, and remanded.

The distinction matters. Relief did not come from the Rule 239a defect standing alone. It came through a bill of review, where the false certification was evidence supporting the elements of that claim — including that the failure was unmixed with any fault of the defendants. The Texas Supreme Court restated this line of authority as recently as Huffman Asset Management, LLC v. Colter, No. 24-0205 (Tex. May 29, 2026) (concurring opinion), which cites Katy Venture as reversing because the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 239a created a fact issue.

Why this is an argument for changing the rule, not for litigating it

Read together, these cases describe a rule that disarms itself. It imposes a duty, then states in its own final sentence that breaching the duty carries no consequence for the judgment. Courts have applied that sentence exactly as written, in 1994 and again in 2026.

A parent who was never notified is therefore left with the harder, slower and more expensive route — a separate lawsuit — while the party who certified the wrong address faces nothing. That is the gap the SAFE SAPCR Act is drafted to close, and it is a drafting problem rather than a judicial one.

The other 75 published Texas opinions citing Rule 239a

Retrieved from the CourtListener full-text database of published opinions. The five cases discussed above account for eight of the 83 distinct entries, because two of them also appear as the lower-court decisions that were later reversed. Listed newest first. This list is provided so the survey above can be checked rather than taken on trust.

  • Javier Vasquez and RJT Commercial, Inc. v. Moises Tonche Vargas, Maria Vargas, Individually and as Next Friend of S.A v. and E.I v. Minors and Saul Vargas (Tex. App.-Houston [15th Dist.] 2025) — 15-25-00080-CV
  • In Re Dannie Smith v. the State of Texas (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2025) — 01-24-01004-CV
  • James McWilliams v. KO Construction, LLC (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2024) — 02-23-00418-CV
  • Balkan Express, LLC v. Stefanie Hollins (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2023) — 01-22-00911-CV
  • Mario A. Davila v. Easy Way Leisure Corporation D/B/A Easy Way Products Co. (Tex. App.-Edinburg-Corpus Christi 2022) — 13-20-00416-CV
  • A.D. Sparlin v. Antonio Gomez (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2021) — 02-20-00236-CV
  • Juan Antonio Rivera and Luz Maria Rivera v. William McCaskill (Tex. App.-Edinburg-Corpus Christi 2021) — 13-20-00353-CV
  • Acadian Properties Austin, LLC v. Kjmonte Investments, LLC (Tex. App.-El Paso 2021) — 08-20-00048-CV
  • MG International Menswear, Inc. v. Robert Graham Designs LLC (Tex. App.-Dallas 2019) — 05-18-00517-CV
  • Asset Protection & Security Services, L.P. v. Virginia Armijo (Tex. App.-El Paso 2019) — 570 S.W.3d 377, 08-17-00250-CV
  • Lutea, L.L.C. and Pharia, L.L.C. v. W.S. Draper AKA Warner Draper (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2018) — 02-18-00120-CV
  • Samotta Richardson-Wiggins v. AH4R Properties Two, LLC. (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2016) — 02-15-00158-CV
  • Copano NGL Services, LLC v. John Ashcraft, Individually and as Trustee for the John Ashcraft Family Trust 2012 (Tex. App.-Edinburg-Corpus Christi 2015) — 13-15-00342-CV
  • Barry Nussbaum v. Builders Bank, an Illinois Banking Corporation (Tex. App. 2015) — 478 S.W.3d 104, NO. 02-14-00304-CV
  • Retaka Romeo Nelson v. Shannon Brochette Nelson (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015) — 01-13-00816-CV
  • Highway 205 Farms, Ltd. and Maurice E. Moore, Jr. v. City of Dallas (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015) — 14-0917
  • Ha Duong Nhu and D&H Restaurant Equipment v. Hunan Ranch Corporation (Tex. App.-Austin 2015) — 03-14-00821-CV
  • Lcs Corrections Services, Inc. D/B/A Coastal Bend Detention Center v. Kimberly Chavera (Tex. App.-Edinburg-Corpus Christi 2013) — 13-12-00591-CV
  • Guillermo Gonzalez v. Eugenio M. Tapia (Tex. App.-Edinburg-Corpus Christi 2009) — 13-08-00039-CV
  • Gonzalez v. Tapia (Tex. App.-Edinburg-Corpus Christi 2009) — 287 S.W.3d 805, 13-08-00039-CV
  • Chike Rapulueke Mbonu v. Office of the Attorney General (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008) — 01-07-00659-CV
  • Mitch Alford v. Robert W. Cary, M.D. (Tex. App.-Tyler 2007) — 12-04-00314-CV
  • in Re Clarendon National Insurance Company (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006) — 01-06-00450-CV
  • Clarendon National Insurance Co. v. Thompson (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006) — 199 S.W.3d 482, 01-05-01071-CV
  • Hahn v. Whiting Petroleum Corp. (Tex. App.-Edinburg-Corpus Christi 2005) — 171 S.W.3d 307, 13-02-391-CV
  • Jose Abel Garza v. Attorney General of Texas and Margarita A. Yogi (Tex. App.-Edinburg-Corpus Christi 2005) — 13-02-00153-CV
  • Garza v. Attorney General (Tex. App.-Edinburg-Corpus Christi 2005) — 166 S.W.3d 799, 13-02-153-CV
  • Layton v. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. (Tex. App.-Edinburg-Corpus Christi 2004) — 141 S.W.3d 760, 13-02-608-CV
  • Eleanore Layton v. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corporation (Tex. App.-Edinburg-Corpus Christi 2004) — 13-02-00608-CV
  • Continental Casualty Co. v. Davilla (Tex. App. 2004) — 139 S.W.3d 374, 2-03-270-CV
  • Continental Casualty Company v. Salvidor Davilla (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004) — 02-03-00270-CV
  • in the Interest of L.R.M., a Child (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003) — 02-02-00409-CV
  • Campbell v. Fincher (Tex. App.-Waco 2002) — 72 S.W.3d 723, 10-00-243-CV
  • Jordan v. Jordan (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001) — 36 S.W.3d 259, 09-00-062 CV
  • Dispensa v. University State Bank (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999) — 987 S.W.2d 923, 14-97-00380-CV
  • Russell Harris v. Dennis J. Moore D/B/A Moore's Trucking (Tex. App.-Austin 1997) — 03-96-00702-CV
  • Norman Communications, Inc. v. Texas Eastman Co. (Tex. App.-Tyler 1997) — 956 S.W.2d 68, 12-95-00222-CV
  • Caldwell v. Barnes (Tex. App.-Edinburg-Corpus Christi 1997) — 941 S.W.2d 182, 13-93-699-CV
  • Graham v. Fashing (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996) — 928 S.W.2d 567, 08-96-00086-CV
  • Alicia Moreno v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Tex. App.-Austin 1995) — 03-94-00668-CV
  • Jordan v. Jordan (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994) — 890 S.W.2d 555, 09-93-269 CV
  • Xu v. Davis (Tex. App.-Waco 1994) — 884 S.W.2d 916, 10-94-228-CV
  • Ovation Homes, Inc. and Leldon W. Shead v. Clark/Kyser Wholesale Lumber, Inc. and John Dunlap (Tex. App.-Austin 1993) — 03-92-00201-CV
  • John v. State (Tex. 1992) — 826 S.W.2d 138, D-1557
  • Long v. McDermott (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991) — 813 S.W.2d 622, 01-90-00467-CV
  • Bloom v. Bloom (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989) — 767 S.W.2d 463, 04-88-00105-CV
  • McDonough v. Williamson (Tex. App. 1987) — 742 S.W.2d 737, B14-87-005-CV
  • United National Bank v. Travel Music of San Antonio, Inc. (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987) — 737 S.W.2d 30, 04-87-00148-CV
  • Pope v. Moore (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987) — 729 S.W.2d 125, 05-86-00840-CV
  • Remley v. Kleypas (E.D. Tex. 1986) — 645 F. Supp. 690, Civ. A. No. B-84-93-CA
  • Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc. (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986) — 715 S.W.2d 721, 01-85-0961-CV
  • City of Laredo v. Threadgill (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985) — 686 S.W.2d 734, 04-84-00336-CV
  • City of Houston v. Arney (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984) — 680 S.W.2d 867, 01-83-00744-CV
  • Buddy L. Inc. v. General Trailer Co., Inc. (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984) — 672 S.W.2d 541, 05-83-00132-CV
  • Munson Engineering, Inc. v. Farris (Tex. App. 1984) — 666 S.W.2d 355, No. C14-83-732-CV
  • Vinklarek v. Vinklarek (Tex. App. 1980) — 596 S.W.2d 197, 17590
  • H. L. McRae Co. v. Hooker Construction Co. (Tex. App. 1979) — 579 S.W.2d 62, 12852
  • Buckler v. Tate (Tex. App. 1978) — 572 S.W.2d 562, 17176
  • Grayson Fire Extinguisher Co., Inc. v. Jackson (Tex. App. 1978) — 566 S.W.2d 321, 19499
  • Hillson Steel Products, Inc. v. Wirth Ltd. (Tex. App. 1976) — 538 S.W.2d 162, 16685
  • Crabbe v. Hord (Tex. App. 1976) — 536 S.W.2d 409, 17711
  • Lee v. Thomas (Tex. App. 1976) — 534 S.W.2d 422, 5534
  • Bohn v. Bohn (Tex. App. 1973) — 498 S.W.2d 267, 836
  • Mansfield State Bank v. Fonville (Tex. App. 1973) — 496 S.W.2d 945, No. 17418
  • Lane Wood Industries, Inc. v. DeMoss (Tex. App. 1973) — 489 S.W.2d 673, No. 11972
  • Cooper v. Hall (Tex. App. 1972) — 489 S.W.2d 409, 8297
  • Swearingen v. Swearingen (Tex. App. 1972) — 487 S.W.2d 784, 15097
  • Sanchez v. Texas Industries, Inc. (Tex. App. 1972) — 485 S.W.2d 385, 5157
  • Griffin v. Browne (Tex. App. 1972) — 482 S.W.2d 716, 15919
  • Allright, Inc. v. Roper (Tex. App. 1972) — 478 S.W.2d 245, 589
  • Farias v. Besteiro (Tex. App. 1970) — 453 S.W.2d 314, 535
  • Texas MacHinery & Equipment Co. v. Gordon Knox Oil & Exploration Co. (Tex. 1969) — 442 S.W.2d 315, B-1287
  • Diamond Chemical Co. v. Sonoco Products Co. (Tex. App. 1968) — 437 S.W.2d 307, 443
  • Finlay v. Jones (Tex. 1968) — 435 S.W.2d 136, B-1007
  • Kelly Moore Paint Co. of Texas v. Northeast National Bank of Fort Worth (Tex. App. 1968) — 426 S.W.2d 591, 16903

How Missing Notice Changes Your Deadlines: Rule 306a

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(4) is the provision most often missed by people who discover a judgment late, and it is the reason the exact date you found out matters enormously.

Ordinarily, deadlines to file a motion for new trial or an appeal run from the date the judgment was signed. Rule 306a(4) changes the starting point when a party neither received the clerk's notice nor acquired actual knowledge of the judgment within twenty days of signing. In that situation, the periods begin on the earlier of the date the party actually received notice or acquired actual knowledge.

The ninety-day ceiling. Rule 306a(4) contains a hard outer limit: in no event do those periods begin more than ninety days after the judgment was signed. If you learned about the judgment on day 91 or later, Rule 306a cannot help you, no matter how blameless your ignorance. This single sentence separates people who still have an appeal from people who need a bill of review.

Rule 306a(5) sets out the mechanics: the party must file a sworn motion establishing the date on which they first received notice or acquired actual knowledge, and the court holds a hearing to determine that date. The sworn motion is a prerequisite — the extended timetable is not self-executing, and simply asserting late discovery in a brief will not accomplish it.

That motion still has to be accepted by the clerk before it counts as filed. If you are filing it without a lawyer, No Se to Pro Se covers what a Texas district clerk needs in order to accept a filing, including the formatting and signature problems that get documents rejected.

Three Ways to Attack a Default Judgment

Which door is open to you depends on timing more than on the strength of your underlying case. The table below summarizes the three principal routes under Texas practice.

Remedies for a Texas default judgment, by deadline
RemedyDeadlineWhat you must show
Motion for new trial 30 days from signing (or from the Rule 306a date, if extended) The three Craddock elements: the failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but due to mistake or accident; a meritorious defense is set up; and granting the motion causes no delay or injury to the other party. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939).
Restricted appeal 6 months from signing You were a party; you did not participate in the hearing that produced the judgment; you filed no timely post-judgment motion, request for findings, or notice of appeal; and error is apparent on the face of the record. Governed by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.
Bill of review 4 years (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.051) The three Baker elements: a meritorious defense, which you were prevented from making by the fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposing party or by official mistake, unmixed with any fault or negligence of your own. Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406–07 (Tex. 1979).

A fourth route exists in a narrow situation: where judgment was rendered on service by publication and the defendant never appeared in person or through counsel of their own choosing, Rule 329 allows a motion for new trial within two years of the judgment, on a petition showing good cause supported by affidavit.

Our guide to overturning a Texas custody order walks through choosing among these, and the bill of review page covers the four-year route in more detail.

When You Were Never Served At All

There is an important doctrinal wrinkle for people who were never served in the first place, and it materially lowers the bar.

In Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that requiring a defendant who was never served to prove a meritorious defense, as a condition of setting aside a default judgment, violates due process. A judgment entered without notice is constitutionally infirm regardless of whether the defendant would have won.

The Texas Supreme Court applied that principle in Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. 2004), holding that a bill of review petitioner who proves he was not served is relieved of proving the first two Baker elements. He must still address the third — that the judgment resulted from no fault or negligence of his own — but as the court observed, a person who was never served cannot be at fault for failing to appear.

The practical effect is that non-service claims and fraud claims are different animals. Proving you were never served is often a cleaner path than proving someone deceived you, because it does not require establishing anyone's state of mind.

Service Requirements Rule 239a Does Not Cover

Because Rule 239a is silent on service, the requirements that actually protect a defendant live elsewhere — and Texas courts apply them strictly when a default judgment is challenged directly.

See improper service in Texas custody cases for how these requirements are commonly missed.

How This Affects SAPCR Cases

In Suits Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship, the verification gap carries consequences that money judgments do not. When notice fails in a SAPCR:

Two features of Texas family law sharpen the problem. First, Texas Family Code § 153.002 makes the best interest of the child the primary consideration in conservatorship and possession — but a court hearing only one side has no way to weigh it. Second, orders that go unchallenged harden: modification under Chapter 156 generally requires showing a material and substantial change in circumstances since the prior order, which is a different and often harder burden than contesting the order in the first place. A parent who misses the default judgment window may find the question is no longer whether the original order was properly entered, but what has changed since.

See also our overviews of default judgments in Texas custody cases, modifying a SAPCR order, and the SAPCR timeline.

How This Plays Out: A Documented Example

In Harris County Cause No. 202417675, a Rule 239a certificate was filed 104 days after the respondent had been personally served, naming an address both parties had abandoned in 2013. A default judgment followed, and he states he did not learn of it for fourteen months. Full timeline and source records are on the case study page. These are allegations in pending litigation; they are contested and no findings have been entered.

That fourteen-month gap is worth tracing against the rules above, because it shows how fast the doors close. A discovery date that far out sits well beyond Rule 306a's ninety-day ceiling and beyond the six-month restricted appeal window, leaving the bill of review as the only remaining route. That is not a quirk of one case. It is the predictable arithmetic of a notice rule with no verification requirement.

How to Check If You Were Affected

  1. Search your county district clerk's website for any case involving your name. In Harris County, records are searchable by party name at no cost.
  2. If a default judgment exists, request a copy of the Rule 239a Certificate of Last Known Address.
  3. Compare the certified address to where you actually lived on that date.
  4. Pull the return of service and the citation, and check whether the return was on file ten days before judgment.
  5. Check the docket sheet for the clerk's notation that notice was mailed. Rule 239a requires that notation; its absence is itself worth documenting.
  6. Fix the date you first learned of the judgment, and gather anything that proves it. If that date is within ninety days of signing, Rule 306a may still be available — act immediately.
  7. Assemble proof of your actual address at the relevant time: lease, utility bills, employment records, mail, or filings in other cases.
  8. Consult a Texas family law attorney. Every remedy above is deadline-driven.

Our documentation checklist covers what to collect and how to organize it.

Step five turns on reading a docket sheet, and the signing date that the deadlines above are measured against is printed on the order itself. If neither document is familiar, No Se to Pro Se covers how to read a docket and how to read a signed order.

What to Request From the District Clerk

When ordering records, ask specifically for certified copies of the following. Requesting the file generally often produces less than requesting these by name:

Frequently Asked Questions

Does Rule 239a require the attorney to verify the address is current?

No. The rule requires certification of a last known email address and mailing address. It imposes no duty to confirm either is current, and provides no mechanism for the court to check them against the return of service or anything else in the file. The rule was amended to add the email address; it added a second thing to certify, not a duty to verify.

If the clerk never mailed notice, is the judgment void?

No. Rule 239a expressly states that failure to comply does not affect finality. The judgment stands until set aside through one of the remedies above — but the failure can extend deadlines under Rule 306a and can be evidence supporting a challenge.

Does a Rule 239a certificate prove that someone was properly served?

No. Rule 239a is post-judgment notice. Service of process is what starts the case and confers jurisdiction, governed by Rules 99, 103, 106, 107 and 109. A Rule 239a certificate is not proof that anyone was properly served.

I found out more than ninety days later. What can I do?

Rule 306a is unavailable past ninety days from signing. A restricted appeal remains possible for six months. Beyond that, the usual route is a bill of review, with a four-year limitations period under § 16.051.

Do I have to prove a meritorious defense if I was never served?

Under Peralta and Caldwell v. Barnes, no — a bill of review petitioner who proves non-service is relieved of showing a meritorious defense and of showing fraud or wrongful act.

Proposed Reforms: The SAFE SAPCR Act

The SAFE SAPCR Act proposes closing the Rule 239a verification gap by requiring:

This page explains publicly available Texas procedural rules and reported appellate decisions for general educational purposes. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client relationship, and cannot account for the facts of your case. Rules and deadlines change, and their application is fact-specific. Consult a licensed Texas family law attorney before acting. Statements about pending litigation describe allegations in public court filings; those allegations are contested and no findings have been entered.

How much time do you actually have left?

Enter the date the order was signed and the date you found out about it. You will see which remedies are still open — motion for new trial, Rule 306a, restricted appeal, or bill of review — and how many days are left on each. Free, no signup, nothing leaves your browser.

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Support Reform

Sign the petition supporting the SAFE SAPCR Act, or contact your legislator directly.